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The U.S. electronics sector has been particularly successful at technological innovation
since the 1940s. This paper addresses governmental policies that influence the process of tech-
nological innovation, drawing on aspects of the history of the electronics sector. Three topics
receive particular attention--( 1) uncertainties, ideas, and imperfect appropriability, (2) returns
to R&D and associated investments, and (3) competition and selection environments. As a
foundation for this discussion, several conceptual frameworks are briefly described and some
classifications for innovation are explored, Le., by importance (basic/ improvemen t), by locus of
change (process/product), by area of application (peaceful/dangerous), by locus of choice
(private/public), and by value (worthwhile/not worthwhile). The discussion is underscored by
the observation that better links between conceptual understanding and policy formulation are
needed in order to derive practical insights into useful actions. Ole specific policy recommen-
dation is tendered.: an income tax credit on earnings of all employees (including salaried staff
and managers) of R&D intensive firms. Such a policy would be appropriate from the stand-
point of the topics outlined above (Le., uncertainties, returns to R&D, and competition); the
policy would also delegate responSibility for effective use of the subsidy to the employees and
firms affected, and would directly acknOWledge and reward the contributions of individuals-
whether in R&D, production, marketing, or support areas-to the innovative capabilities of their
firms and the society at large.
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INDUSTRIAL INNOVAllO'J AND GOVERNMENTAL
PCLley: A REVIEW AND PROPOSAL PASED CN
OBSERVAllCNS OF 'THE U.S. ELECTRONICS SECfOR
Alvin Jay Harm an
L PERSPECTIVES ｾ 1HE "REAL WORLD"l
When economists leave their theoretical models aside, they often refer to circumstances
in the "real world II This reality is, of course, much more complex than the economists'
theoretical formulations, but it is precisely the simplifying assumptions that allow the theOrist to
analyze fundamental influences conceptually and to verify them empirically.
Like theory development, policy formulation and implementation also depend on abstrac-
tions from the ·real world· In April 1978 President Carter initiated a 'nomestic Policy Review
of Industrial Innovation" for the United States. The Secretary of Commerce was charged with
leading the review to answer the ｱ ｵ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ 'What actions 5hould the Federal Government take
to encourage technological innovation?" Suggestions were sought from business, labor, and
consumer groups as well as from "experts." The observations, analyses, and opinions rendered
dUring this process had to be interpreted in the light of broader economic and political con-
siderations before the President's mdustrial Innovation Initiatives" were formulated and
promulgated (Carter 1979).
lne legislative branch has also been ｾ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Ｎ Staffers have sought information and drafted
position papers, hearings have been held, and specific pieces of legislation have been formu-
lated
Meanwhile the ·real world" continues to evolve: new products are announced, new com-
panies are formed, and some of the existing companies "disappear" through merger or ban-
kruptcy. The "real world" is changing and new problems are arising. The policy formulation
r;:-ｾｬｩｭｩｮ｡ｲｹ ｶ･ｲｾｩｯｮ of this paper wu prepared for presentation at the International Institute for Applied
ｓ ｹ ｾ ｴ ･ ｭ ｳ Analysis' Worlr.shop on Innovation Polley and Firm Strategy.•-6 December 19'9. Schloss Laxen-
burg. A ustria, under sponsorship of The Rand Corporation. Santa Monica, California. u part of irs program
of public service. Support for this worlr. is gratefully aclr.nowledged. but the views expressed are the author's
ｾ ｷ ｮ Ｎ and are not necessarily shared by Rand or iu research sponsors.
See Industrial Technology (19'8). which provides the record of a hearing on governmenta.l policy and inno-
vation in the semiconductor and computer industries, together with a summary of several previous hearings
on industria.! technology: see also Gilpin ( ＱＹＧｾＩＮ
-2 -
process resulting directly from the Domestic Policy Review will continue for several years, dur-
ing which time legislative and other action will be taken. Policy action will often take several
more years to be fully implemented. Some implementation steps will be undertaken by indivi-
duals with limited understanding of the ·subtle and intricate process" (Carter 1979. p.5) that
they will be charged with influencing. Thus the policy process can produce errors in govern-
mental action affecting technological innovation as easily as the simplifying assumptions of the
theorist can produce errors of insight about the innovation process.
In short. conceptual formulations attempt to interpret reality and policy initiatives attempt
to influence reality. Like the two fists of a boxer. it would be highly desirable if the two
approaches were coordinated and directed at identifying and ameliorating or removing real
problems. each approach sensitive to the many subtleties and limitations of the other. Even
then there would be value issues to ｲ･ｳｯｬｶ･ｾＮｧ .• the choice of 'argets" for policy actions. "&t
too often theoretical models and policy initiatives are developed independently of one another.
are often uncoordinated-more analogous to the claws of a lobster than the fists of a boxer-and
can produce unforeseen interference as well as progress.
In this paper I will both briefly sketch a few of the competing conceptual formulations for
understanding technological innovation at the firm and industry level of aggregation. and dis-
cuss some of the policy actions that have been considered (or taken) in the past-:in the context
of the U.S. electronics sector. In the course of these observations. I will comment on the need
for further research and policy initiatives.
Although the prinCipal ob,Fctive of this paper is to foster discussion. a specific policy
recommendation is tendered To simulate technological innovation while delegating to the firm
the responsibility of choice among options, I have suggested a personal income tax credit on
earnings of all employees and salaried staff and managers of R&D intensive firms. This would
become, to some extent, an indirect subsidy to the ｦ ｩ ｲ ｭ ｳ ｾ ｮ ･ that could be used for a range of
options, such as further R&D. new hiring, capital investment. etc. This policy would be rela-
tively more favorable to smaller and more labor-intensive firms; it would also avoid some of
the inherent biases favoring high income tax brackets as found in many capital gains tax propo-
sals. The fiscal impact of the policy would have to be coordinated with broader fiscal policy
obtctives, and perhaps enacted in conjJnction with encouragement of new investment and/or
greater venture capital aVailability. O1e of the main Objectives of such an income tax credit
would be to directly acknowledge and reward the contribution of individuals-whether in R&D,
production, marketing, or support areas-to the innovative capabilities and economic vitality of
their firms and the society at large.
-s-
n. CCNCEPIUAL APPROACHES TO lECHNa..OOlCAL lNNOVA1100
The tenn "innovation" is widely used today to describe aspects of economic growth and
development; innovation is also identified as an objective of a variety of national policy instrU-
ments. Simon Kuznets (1971, espedally Ct. 7) has theorized that economic growth and
development can be viewed in very long time streams. He has identified what he has called
"economic epochs" extending ｾ ｶ ･ ｲ a period of more than a century; in his view each epoch is
characterized by an "epochal innovation," something so fundamental to the societies of the time
that it helps to generate a whole stream of activities. He has labeled one such epoch "mercan-
tile capitalism," extending between the end of the fifteenth century and the second half of the
eighteenth century. 'A mapr influence dUring this period was radically changing geographic per-
ceptions of the world, centering around the discovery of the "new world." OIerseas trade was an
important element contributing to the growth of individual nations dUring this period. Our
"modem" economic growth began in the succeeding epoch, dUring the late eighteenth century.
According to Kuznets, this period has been characterized by extended application of science to
problems of economic production.
Such views of the past may be helpfUl in drawing lessons from history, but it would be
very difficult for contemporary man to identify the commencement of a new economic epoch of
this sort. Some conclusions have been drawn about the importance of computers, or the "infor-
mation society," But even with the maj:lr progress that has been made in this century in quan-
titative measurement of economic growth, methodologies for measuring changes in the quality
of goods and services available within and between nations are either nonexistent or extremely
crude.
The Innovation Process
If we view "technological innovation" as the introduction of a new or significantly
improved product or process into the economy through the application of modern technology,
then quality change and cost constitute the essence of such innovation. In recent decades,
governments and finns have expended considerable energy and Ijources in attempts to organ-
ize the innovation process efficiently and to direct it toward useful results.
Feedback from one stage of the research and development (R&D) process can help in
formulation or reformulation at other stages; learning must take place so that an innovative
concept can be confirmed to be both technically feasible and desired by the user. The qualita-
tive nature of purely prucess innovations permits them to be measured relatively easily and
quantitatively-in terms of cost reductions in the delivery of an identical end product. In con-
trast, the qualitative nature of product innovations is much more complicated, especially
because the original objectives of the innovation may turn out to be secondary to other applica-
tions that are discovered after the innovation has become more widely diffused into an econ-
omy. For example, the demanding requirements for reliability and security of real-time applica-
tions of computers in the financial sector were hardly anticipated when the first computers were
be ing in trodu ced.
Serendipity plays an important role in the historical development of a branch of technol-
ogy and its applications. The lines of descent of today's technological innovations can be stu-
died, but it is much more difficult to anticipate the future directions of curren t trends. The
an tecedents of the U.S. electronics sector can be traced back to the first prototype light bulb
burned by Thomas Edison a hundred years ago. The earliest antecedents of the high volume
production of much of today's electron ics circuitry should include Eli Whitney's inven tio n of
rifles with in terchangeable parts, as well as Henry Ford's mass productio n tech niques.
S·Useful· here refen to the distinction between innovations which yield quality ｣ ｨ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｳ thlt lITe ·worth" what
they cost and those which lITe not.
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Gpportunities to commercialize the results of these innovations were different; in the Whitney
and Ford examples, a well-defined market opportunity existed. The needs of the ultimate user
in terms of both product quality and price were critical to the success of all the innovations.
It is difficuj to summ artze succinctly the meaning of the phrase "anticipating the needs
of the final user. In part this stems from the variety of potential final users for the vast array
of goods and services aVailable in an economy like that of the United States. Also, most of the
goods and services are amenable to some form of technological innovation over time. so that
either the characteristics of the product sought by the final user or the cost of production is sus-
ceptible to change. In Figure I a categorization scheme is suggested for distinguishing between
choices of final goods and services by either private or public decisionmakers, as well as for
considering the applicability of these choices to two broad categories of final goods and
services- identified as "peaceful" or "dangerous." These distinctions are by no means clear-cut;
the categories "peaceful" and "dangerous" are descriptions of the extremes of a continuum of
goods and services (hereafter referred to as "productsi rather than mutually exclusive
categories. Research and development can lead to technological innovations in either of these
categories. Moreover. the earlier the stage of the R&D process (e.g.• basic research). the less
identifiable is the work with either of the extremes of this continuum (f any point in
between). If we distinguish between technological innovations that are "basic· and those that
constitute improvements," we should recognize that basic innovations can be motivated by
end-tlses at any point along the spectrum of final products. Innovations that led to the emer-
gence of the English cotton textile industry in the late eighteenth century and the development
of atomic energy in the mid-twentieth century illustrate this point.
"Improvement" innovations can have two different Objectives; they can enhance products
subsequent to the original application of a basic innovation (e.g.• improvements in spinning and
weaving machinery or in nuclear weapons design), or they can permit the application of a basic
innovation for new-end uses. Le.. a movement on the continuum between peaceful and
dangerous products. The directions of such innovations are motivated by the "needs" that are
perceived to be worth satisfying.
Thus, consideration of decisionmaking about uses of the final products reveals influences
on technological innovation from sources other than technology. For final products that are not
"dangerous" and for which private choices are most relevant, market forces have been demon-
strated. both theoretically and empirically. to efficiently allocate scarce resources and to provide
signals about the need for further technological innovation. The limited acceptance of the ini-
tial strains of high.,ield rice produced in what has come to be called the "green revolution"
occurred because the reduction in product quality (e.g.• tastiness and texture) had unanticipated
consequences for prices. improvement" innovations were needed to enhance the quality of the
new strains. to make them more competitive with available alteratives. Such innovative activi-
ties can occur without deliberate pUblic sector intervention. In contrast, public choice is
widely recognized as the relevant perspective for products relating to a nation's military capabil-
ity. and mark.et forces would proVide inadequate guidance for technological innovation. Under
such circumstances. reliance is placed on bureaucratic and political decisions.
It is important to consider these distinctions explicitly, for national security ｾ ｱ ｵ ｩ ｲ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ Ｎ
as perceived by nation al interests. govern a great deal of publicly supported R&D. All coun-
tries rely to some degree on bureaucratic and political decisionmaking in assessing the "needs"
4A boo the ·needs" a linn deems worth satisfying may be different from thl! "needs" vjewed as important by
societ), at luge.
ｾ Ｂ ｂ ｡ ｳ ｩ ｣ Ｂ innovations imply the opening up of a whole new lIeld of produa applications. or permit efficiency
improvementS through the development of a new technology.
6The crucial ingredient, as Nancy Nimitz empha.uzes, is the existence of COlt-cOMdous and discriminating
ｾ Ｍ ｲ ｩ Ｇ Ｌ Ｚ ｾ ｾ "national ｩ ｮ ｾ ｲ ･ ｳ ｴ ｳ Ｂ may be subject to a broad range of interpretation at a particular point in time, for
instance by leaders as different as Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Delano Rooseveh. and Adolf
Hitler.
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Figure 1. Microanalytic view of final goods and services,
and private or public choice
that determine allocation of pUblicly and privately supported R&D.
This discussion of the roles of market forces and bureaucratic/political decisions in darify-
ing the needs of the ultimate user-to whom succe$sful technological innovation is directed-is
applicable (to a greater or lesser extent) across the whole continuum of final products. For
example, there are recognized and legitimate roles for government regulation of pharmaceuti-
cals in the health-care delivery field in the United States. There is also an expanding govern-
ment role in determining appropriate rates of reimbursement for medical services, as well as
activities by the courts in' detennining responsibility and dam ages for malpractice. It is striking
that such public sector activities exist in an environment in which the medical profession has
traditionally been relied upon to seek. improvements in modes of medical intervention, in which
the hospital sector has sought to attract physicians to its staff through noniJrice competition
(e.g.• investments in the latest medical technologies), and in which the recipients of medical
services are widely regarded as having incomplete information for choosing among medical ser-
vices and few incentives for being wcos t conscious· in such choices. Satisfaction of the ·needs
of the ultimate user" through further technological innovation In medical eqUipment and instru-
mentation involves responding to a very complex set of wmarketW incentives; in such cir-
cumstances, public policy initiatives can have quite unanticipated effects (Rettig and Hannan
1979) .
Economic Concepts
The activities of industrial enterprises (firms) undertaking technological innovation should
be analyzed within a conceptual framework that captures the personal motivations of the
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participants, as well as more structured decision processes regarding product objectives. This
framework should take into consideration both the context of market forces and the non-
market environment. Despite a great deal of economic research on this topic, no concensus has
been reached regarding such a conceptual framework. Thus, it seems desirable to use an eclec-
tic approach as a guide to ·policy formulation.
Neoclassical theory has been receiving increasingly critical reviews in recent years. Still, it
retains the advantage of being the most parsimonious description of the essential elements of a
firm's economic motivations. Neoclassical theory ignores, however, the intrinsic uncertaintilf
of the R&D process, treating them at best as an a priori known distribution of risky outcomes.
Two other approaches to understanding firm behavior appear particularly intriguing. Nel-
son and Winter (1977) have argued for an evolutionary theory; it includes modeling of the
intrinsic uncertainties of the innovative process with the aid of a set of conditional probabilistic
outcomes of varous R&D strategies. Nelson and Winter have also suggested that it may be
important to recognize the role of institutional structures, in various economic sectors, in deter-
mining innovative outcomes. There may be a variety of "selection environments" that capture
the competitive aspects of firm behavior and the needs of the ultimate user. These "selection
environments" incorporate three elements: the determination of the "worth" (e.g., profit) of
innovation activities by firms, the ways in which consumer and regulatory demands shape
profitability, and the investment and imitation processes that are involved.
Nelson and Winter consider both market and non market "selection environments." The
principle distinction they propose is that in nonmarket sectors the interests of "firms" and "cus-
tomers" are not as Sharply defined as in the market sectors. They suggest that "natural trajec-
tories" of technologies occur in which obvious weak spots in product designs .or targets for
improvement can be identified. Such natural trajectories can lead to rapid advancements in
some economic sectors, while other sectors, lacking such natural trajectories, progress more
slowly. The development of electronic components from vacuum tubes to very large scale
integrated (VlSI) circuitry seems to provide an example of a natural trajectory. The widely
used S-shaped curve of technological advancement-i.e., initial rapid advancement in terms of
quality enhancement of an end-product's principal dimensions, and then a slowing-<:an be
understood in terms of such trajectories and their underlying scientific and technological base.
In contrast, Klein suggests an explanation based on a dynamic theory:
The principal reason why technologies come to be defined very narrowly
and why the rate of progress eventually slows down is not because of a
shortage of ideas, but rather because of a ｳｨｯｲｴｾＭ･ of hidden foot feed-
back. Hidden foot feedback is the feedback a firm obtains from its riVals;
and it is measured in terms of changes in market share...· Inasmuch as
what is a techncllogical risk to one firm in an industry, is a competitive
risk to another, the more technological ｲｩｳｫｾ｡ｫＮｩｮｧ that is undertaken in
developing products with nontrivial differences, the greater will be the
changes in market shares.... Almost inevitably, the larger the advances
that are sought, the wider will be the differences between more and less
successful R&D projects, and the larger will be the change in market
shares [Klein 1979, pp.7-81
Thus, Klein argues that intensive technological innovation and rapid rates of technological pro-
gress by firms are derived from the threat of a potentially successful rival. He further argues
that the successful firm-Qne that grows and as a result becomes more bureaucratic-becomes
susceptible to narrowing the range of investigation for resolVing future uncertainties, and hence
for coming up with further innovations. Klein argues that the rate of technological innovation
s:r;e ｡ ｵ ｲ ｨ ｯ ｾ has used this approach in the past, with its m any simplifying ulumptions; see Harman 19' I, Ch.
ｾ Ｎ See also the AppendIX, to WhICh the policy discussion below refers.
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for an individual firm may slow because of the tendency of such internal bureaucracy to estab-
lish routines and to preserve the status quo. The prindpal factor that detennines whether or
not the industry remains -dynamic- (Le., continues with rapid introduction of new process or
product innovations) is the ability of new finns to enter the industry.
Finally, technological innovation in general has alS% been stimulated in important ways by
the demands of a diverse and international marketplace. The standard conception of interna-
tional trade explains trade patterns according to a nation's comparative advantage for efficient
production, based on the relative abundance of its resources, labor, and capital. An important
extension of this theory, to the sphere of newly developed products. interprets international
trade as being based on technology itself. The theory has also been extended to include the
concept of. a product life ｣ｹ｣ｾ･Ｌ irIO"hiCh the ability to prodUce certain products by firms in vari-
ous countnes changes over time.
In early phases, few firms are innovators, and have the reqUired production know-how.
As technology diffuses and imitation occurs, trade patterns are influenced more strongly by the
traditional factors that detennine compararive advantage. For example, standard electronic
components that involve labor-intensive production will be cheaper for U.S. producers and final
consumers if they are imported from countries where labor is relatively cheaper than in the
United States.
A firm can maintain its comparative advantage by continuing to evolve its product line in
advance of its competitors (see Harman 1971, Ch. 3). This can occur, of course, only as long
as a scientific and technological base exists to support such technological innovation and as long
as the means of at least tempOrarily capturing the economic gains of the innovative activities
are sustained. In other words, products will have periods of rapid growth and international
marketing, followed by periods of consolidation. -Q)Osolidation- may not mean a slowing of
the potential for further technological advances; but the new products that could be developed
may not be suffidently valued by users to merit the price that would have to be Charged for
them in the national or international marketplace.
Thus, technologically determined trade patterns are intrinsically temporary, though they
may last for a long time. The U.S. advantage in computers and semiconductors has been fos-
tered by a continuing stream of advances in technology. At the upper end of the computer
lines, this advantage is still unchallenged internationally;}o less than four U.S. firms compete
for customers. Some recent developments, such as the network-oriented computer, have been
made possible in part by the new capabilities of the semiconductor industry. Such develop-
ments suggest that the American computer industry is continuing to be innovative. Participation
in international markets not only affects the U.S balance of payments, but also provides oppor-
tunities for access to a wide spectrum of new ideas, so necessary to further product develop-
ments.
gThis is true for semiconductors and computers 111 particular.
10See for exam ple. Vernon 196' and ;Usa ｈｵｦ｢｡ｵ･ｾ 1970.
- 8-
TIL SOME OBSERVATIO'lS O'l POlley LEVERAGE II
Uncertainties, Ideas, and Imperfect Appropriability
A fitting place to begin the discussion of policy leverage on technological innovation is
with the motivations of the individual. A wide spectrum of individuals is needed for successful
technological innovation (or, alternatively, individuals with a wide spectrum of capabilities).
Not only an inventor" and "developer," is needed, but also a "product champion" who makes
the case for backing a particular concept throughout its development process, a "gatekeeper"
who helps with the flow of information within a large organization and between the organization
and the outside world, a "production specialist" who keeps the concern for production efficiency
prominent dUring the development process as well as dUring production, "salesmen" who distri-
bute the end products and provide the organization with feedback regarding the unmet needs of
various classes of users, and an "entrepreneur." (See, for example, Zaltman et al. 197$.) A
president of one of the U.S. semiconductor firms describes the importance of these individuals
as follows:
For us to maintain technological leadership in a competitive world we
must stimulate the total society to find its strength in its own members.
Novelty comes from a self-confident personality. This entrepreneur will
create innovations for the pure zest of achievement throUgh the incentive
of the well-being of himself, his loved ones and his neighbors.
In essence, the process of successful technological innovation ultimately depends on one
or more individuals coming up with good ideas. The exploration of good ideas-the difficult
process of resolving uncertainties to achieve a successful new product or process--eannot be
measured simply in terms of dollars expended. Some concepts for the new design of a piece of
computer hardware may rely on readily available electronic components or technologies. In
fact, the Amdahl line of computers used components for memories that were available "off-
ｴ ｨ ･ ｾ ｨ ･ ｬ ｦ Ｂ from more than one source. Novelty in the design rtfne from effidently packing the
components, while maintaining competitive sources of supply.
Direct Support of R&D
Government policies can affect the development of new ideas in a number of ways. 13
First of all, financial backing for basic research activities has been considered a legitimate role
of government both theoretically and in practice. In recent times, privately funded basic
research has been Significantly curtailed (see Nason et al. 1978; Industrial Technology 1978,
rr:rhis seCtion draws upon the experience of the computer and semiconduaor Industries. Principal sources
used include Industrial Jnnovllion (1978). Brllln and MacDonald (1978), PlUater (197f). TIlton (1971). and
Harm an (1971). The quotes from executiVes included ., this leaion were tallen from correspondence fol-
loWing a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Tnnsportllion (Jndustrial
Technology 1978). In the preparation of earlier remarks (Harman 1978), on which thil section iI based, the
author benefited greatly from exchanges of ideas with R. Anderson, A. Alexander, W. Baer, C. Eads. f.M.
fisher, D. Jaffee• .E. Mansfield, R. Perry, R. Rettig, E. Thomas, J. Utterback. and W. Wve. The author is
also indebted to Rand Craduate Institute studenu-m particUlarly to J.L. Bums, B. W. Don, LB. Embry,
and W.1.. Schwabe-4"orstimularing discussions of some of these issues.
12for further description of the design of this memory and the entire Amdahl computer, see Hannan et al.
1977, pp. n--t I.
ISFor the purpnes of this discussion the very im porrant role that government actions can play in the rapid
and low cost diuemination of information is left aside. One of President Caner', nine veas of initatiVes in-
cludes such acrions-4"or example, increased monitoring of information on foreign R&:D activities (Caner
1979, pp.2-3).
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p.33; and Carter 1979, p.i). In the context of augmenting basic research support, It seems
important to try to develop a closer link between industry and the universities. In this connec-
tion the view of another President of a semiconductor firm is relevant:
We believe that closer links are very desirable. OJr endorsement is
based on our participation in and observation of the excellent links
between Stanford and local industry. We are also aware that this came
about through a vision and interest of a few individuals and is not gen-
erally experienced by most universities and their industrial neighbors.
An approach that might be considered is to revise the federal income tax
laws to provide a tax credit for corporate funds that are given to universi-
ties for research. Since this would supplement and not replace govern-
ment research grants, the amounts would have to be limited. Perhaps
two or three percent of a company's in4l0use RlcD bUdget would be an
appropriate ceiling. 01 a 125 billion base, two percent would generate a
maximum of 1500 million, which would represent about a ten percent
increase in university research funds.
Govemment funding at a later stage of R&D has also been important After World War
II the U.S. government promoted considerable activity in both the computer and semiconductor
fields through its defense programs and later throUgh its space program. More recently the
Japanese government has used the direct subsidy route, with funding estimated to be on the
order of 1500 million or more. The British government also is investing in its semiconductor
industry, on the order of 50 to 100 million pounds. The French government has several activi-
ties in progress which involve investments in the French semiconductor industry, and the
Korean government is trying to establish a viable semiconductor industry committed to consu-
mer goods applications (Corrigan 1978, pp.31-32). Thus, direct government support of R8cD is
a widespread mechanism for helping in the development of new ideas to sustain a country's
technological innovations; the level of government resources committed to the support of tech-
nological innovation is one measure of the seriousness with which the government and the
companies in a given country are pursUing new technologies. However, it is not necessarily a
good measure of successful innovations.
Patent Policies
The patent system is, of course, designed to encourage the development of new ideas-
"flashes of creative geniUS." This is clearly an area in which policy implementation can have
important repercussions. Note, for instance, the difficulties that were caused by the extreme
delay in the granting of a patent, as in the case of ENIAC computer (see Hannan 1978, pp.6,9;
and Gilpin 1975). New challenges are presented by the need to protect such intangibles as
computer programs.
Towards a New Tax Policy for Innovation
The many individuals who contribute to the creation and practical development of new
ideas collectively form the iabor· component of neoclassical production functions. In the
Appendix, a very simplified model of induced technological innovation is presented to illustrate
that a firm's investment in enhancement of labor prod,uctivity is directly related to its total
expenditure on labor and inversely proportional to the marginal cost of improving labor produc-
tiVity. Fisher has observed that some labor skills may not receive the full "rents" due to them
in the process of technological innovation.
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Even the case of special managerial skills need not result in rents being
fully inputed to the factors of production with which they are properly
assodated Particularly in large firms dealing with complicated and deli-
cate technologies, it is perfectly possible for the added effidency to accrue
not to any small group of individuals but to the firm as a whole. If that
is true, then while it would be possible for others to bid away any small
group of individuals, managerial efficiendes would still rest in the organi-
zation, the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. In that cir-
cumstance there would still be unimputed rents. .. (Fisher 1978, p.27).
In the course of uncertainty resolution dUring a development process, teamwork. among
specialists can also lead to improved communication or other -group skills.- The development
of the transistor provides an example. It was preconditioned by certain scientific knowledge and
simultaneous progress in several fields of investigation; this involved collaboration among an
interdisciplinary ｴ ･ ｾ of physicists, chemists, metallurgists, and engineers (Braun and Mac-
Donald 1979, 01.4). 4 Technological development often requires the coordinated talents of a
large number of highly specialized individuals. Such teamwork. is also needed to carry out tasks
outside the technical sphere.
It should be kept in mind that the transistor was developed dUring an era in which tax
policies and the aVailability of venture capital were considerably different than they are today.
The above analysis suggests the need for a new tax policy initiative compatible with today's cir-
cumstances: it may be desirable to implement a personal income tax credit affecting all indivi-
duals employed by the most R&D intensive firms. Such a personal income tu·credit would
serve several purposes. First, the initial impact would be to increase the take-home pay of all
individuals employed in highly R&D intensive firms. These could be firms with higher than
the median expenditure on R&D, expressed as the percent of sales for the last 2 years; alterna-
tively two levels of tax credit could be instituted for employees of firms with R&D expenditures
greater than, say, Ｔ ｾ and 71. of sales, respectively. Since employment security in such firms is
generally lower than in other sectors of the econom y, this tax credit could be considered com-
pensation for additional risks that may not be compensated at prevailing wage rates in current
labor markets, especially in the case of smaller and newer R&D intensive companies. Second,
since labor markets may not compensate for such risks currently, there is little reason to
believe that the full increase in take-home pay would remain with labor after the marketplace
has a chance to adjJst to this new tax initiative. GradUally the effective wage rate paid by the
firms would be reduced This would proVide an incentive for firms to keep R&D commitments
high enough to qualify their employees for the personal income tax credit The tax credit's
effect on wage rates paid might also enco'lrage firms to invest in labor productivity enhance-
ment, if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently hlgtt. Of course, there would be attempts by
firms to reclassify expenses as R&D in order to qualify their employees for the credit. Such
problems reqUire serious attention, but as Hufbauer has argued, they are not necessarily ins-
uperable (Industrial Technology 1978, p.I22).
Clearly, further resean:h would be useful to verify the correctness of these observations
and to determine the appropriate magnitude of such a tax credit. If this tax initiative were part
of a larger tax revision package for technological innovation that encouraged greater availability
of venture capital, such a proposal might be particularly beneficial to newer and smaller firms
(Which tend to be more labor-intensive). It would also avoid the perverse distribution implica-
tions of many capital gains tax proposals. which tend to provide tax relief mainly in high
income tax brackets (Musgrave 1978). The personal income tax credit proposed here is a pos-
sible way to encourage the "bearing of risk" that is widely recognized as an important element
I4Some team m;;;;-bers eventually left and fcmned their own companies. SimilllTly. Control Diltl Corpora-
tion Wls formed in 19S7 by a group thilt hid been pan of Sperry Rand's Univac Division (Harman 1971.
p.19).
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of technological innovation. As has been argued on a previous occasion, "When individuals (in
management, in labs, in production, in sales, etc.) must operate in a world fraught with risk
and uncertainty to achieve such innovation ｾ ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｩ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ when they must rely on their creative
ideas to ensure the success of their enterprises-they must be allowed generous compensation
for the activities that bring their ideas to fruition- (Industrial Technology 1978, p.15). This
subject will receive further consideration at the conclusion of this paper.
Returns to R&D and Associated Investments
It is very difficult to acquire the detailed infonnation necessary to make careful calcula-
tions of the returns to R&D or related investments required in the process of technological
innovation. In an earlier study of the computer industry, it was possible to estimate econometr-
ically the responsiveness of product quality change to investments in R&:Dby finns (Harman
1971). This analysis confirmed that some of the smaller and newer firms had qUite effective
R&D efforts. However, product quality is not a measure of profitability; in fact, success in the
computer industry has often been attained by a shrewd choice of prodUct design that avoided an
ambitious push to the limits of technical feasibility (Harman 1971, Ch.4). OJ the average, one
would expect that returns from this type of investment would be higher than the average for
the industrial sector because of the risks inherent in R&D. The risks are well illustrated by GE
and RCA, neither of which were able to profitably participate in the computer industry in the
mid-1960s (Harman 1971, pp.16-17. 22-26). The process technology of transistors provides
another example; it changed so rapidly that the original innovator-PhUco-soon dropped out of
the industry with a ｬｾＬ unprofitable capital investment in what rapidly became obsolete pro-
duction eqUipment (Braun and MacDonald 1978, pp.I42-3).
The recent ｰ ｡ ｴ ｨ ｾ ｲ ･ ｡ ｫ ｩ ｮ ｧ research of Mansfield and his colleagues. in measuring not only
the private but also the social rates of return from industriallnnovations, sheds new light on
thiS topic. However, their research involves a nonrandom sample of seventygt innovations that
do not necessarily represent the results of activities in the electronics sector.
Mansfield and his team found that the social rate of retum from industrial innovation has
been very high-the median is conservatively estimated to be over 50 Percent. However, they
also found that the private rates of return from these investments have been much lower. In
nearly a third of their cases the private rate of return was so low that -no firm with the advan-
tage of hindsight, would have invested in the innovation, but the social rate of return from the
innovation was so high that, from society's point of view, the investment was well worthwhile"
(Mansfield et al. 1977, p.235). These authors point out, however, that for a number of rea-
sons such results have little bearing on whether there is an underinvestment in innovative
activities.
Tax Policies
KnOWledge about the -real world" returns from investments in technological innovation is
in very short supply. Representatives from the semiconductor industry have uniformly and fer-
vently argued for a more favorable tax structure to encourage such investments. He ilmeier, for
example, has pointed out specific sections of the tax statutes and regulations that he believes
either are a disincentive to perform R&D or an encouragement to U.S. firms to transfer more
R&D to foreign countries. He further points out that -government agendes have no way of
reviewing the regulations in the light of their impact on development of U.S. technology and
innovation- (Heilmeier 1978, p.21). Perkins points out the difficulty of hiring and retaining
T"5:fhe one innovation that is Identified LI a new electronic device is the onl)' one of their ｾ ｡ ｭ ｰ ｬ ･ that pro-
duced a nega-tille rate of return both in private and social terms (see M'ansfleld et al. 1977).
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entrepreneurial managers subsequent to the removal of special tax treatment for the ·qualified
stock option: Without this form of stock option the manager recruited to a new enterprise
must pay a capital gains tax on stock upon exercising this option, even if the gains he achieves
are illiquid unless he sells his stock (Perkins 1978, p.43).
Although the Revenue Act of 1978 restored some of the capital gains tax incentives
removed by the capital gains taxes of 1968 and subsequent years, industry can legitimately
claim that the tax environment for venture capital availability and risky investments has
deteriorated over the last decade. At the same time, the National Science Foundation has
reported that nearly 40 percent of the R&D activity in private industry is financed by federal
funds (some 10 billion dollars in 1977). Hufbauer has reported that, "m addition, Section 174
of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits the immediate expensing of R&D outlays on
salaries and expendable supplies (but not capital equipment), entails a modest incentive by
comparison with the conceptual alternative of capitalizing and amortizing all R&D outlays. The
value of this incentive in 1977 was about 11.4 billion· (Hufbauer 1978, p.18). Kaplan and his
colleagues summarize a set of studies of tax policies for R&D and technological innovation by
noting that foreign countries often provide more generous tax incentives for R&D than does
the United States; however, such problems as the difficulty of rewarding new R&D activities
versus simply subsidizing already existing ones, and undesirable distributional problems suggest
to them that ·a program of direct government support of innovation is preferable to tax incen-
tives. Of course, it must still be demonstrated that the govemment can devise a program of
direct support that operates with as little red tape and delay as many tax incentive schemes"
(Kaplan et al. 1976, p.18).
In the absence of strong empirical support for the claim that the market is failing to pro-
vide adequate incentives, the best evidence of the need for policy initiatives comes, perhaps,
from the political decision to initiate the Domestic Policy Review on Innovation; further evi-
dence may be derived from the fact that the results of the Review led President Carter and his
prinCipal advisors to initiate some specific decisions and legislative recommendations that were
expected to nave a significant impact· and to ·provide a signal to the private sector that innova-
tio n is valued and th at it is fede ral policy to preserve and promote it in the years ahe ad" (Carter
1979, p.l). The proposals were not Widely regarded as significant (see Stanfield 1979), and all
tax policy changes affecting industrial innovation were explicitly deferred, to be considered later
in the context of broad fiscal policies.
Regulatory Policies
In addition to strong support for a more favorable tax environment, firms in the electron-
ics sector have been concerned about the expanding regulatory activities of the federal govern-
ment. For example, a president of a semiconductor finn has stated:
Desirable as favorable tax policies are, however, they would fail to stimu-
late innovation if they were hamstrung by the usual government demands
for reports, studies, and impact statements. There is also scm e hazard
that favorable treatment would be available only for 'socially desirable'
technologies, adding endless cost and compleXity to defending technology
proposals.
O1e of the PreSident's nine areas for specific decisions regarding innovation is ·improving
our regulatory system." This includes greater emphasis on performance standards (rather than
design or specification standards) for the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as the
implementation of "innovation waivers.· To help reduce regulatory uncertainties for industry,
five-year forecasts of their priorities and concerns are to be prepared by health, safety, and
environmental regulatory agen cies. O1e of the latest (and perhaps most dubious) actions is the
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decision to have executive agencies develop and implement a system of priorities for expediting
review of the safety and efficacy of products that "are most innovative and! or have exceptional
social benefits." Such attempts at forecasting or a priori assessments of the social desirability or
undesirability of innovations is, at best a highly uncertain undertaking-especially for the more
"basic" innovations that have both large positive and negative impacts. Kuznets, for example,
has pointed out that there are long chains of sequences of impacts associated with basic
innovations-from the development of "useful knowledge and science to technological innova-
tion, to growth in productivity to changes in structure of production, to changes in other
aspects of economic structure, to changes in political and social structure and beliefs, and back
again to changed conditions of life and won..."(Kuznets 1971, p.M9).
Ole of the characteristics of such long sequences is "the near impossibility of making a
complete and relatively reliable prediction of the ｬ ｯ ｮ ｧ ｾ ･ ｲ ｭ consequences of a given mapr tech-
nological innovation ... to foresee not only the favorable or neutral, but also the adverse conse-
quences" (Kuznets 1971, p.356). To illustrate the point, Kuznets poses the following question:
Was it foreseen, or at the time predictable, that the spread of the motor
car, by inducing migration of the middle and high income groups from
the cities to the dormitory suburbs, would result in a breakdown of the
urban tax base and lead to a near-collapse of effective municipal
government-with all the ensuing problems with which mapr dties in the
United States are presently struggling? ...If a prediction had suggested
the problem to be created in two or three decades by traffic congestion in
the cities, the impUlse to an immediate counteracting policy would have
been weakened by the argument that there's plenty of time and condi-
tions may change. ...In view of the limited capacity of society to deal
with the many problems needing solution, the lag in the attempt to avoid
or inhibit the ｬ ｯ ｮ ｧ ｾ ･ ｲ ｭ undesirable structural change is almost inevit-
able. (Kuznets 1971, pp.352-353).
This is not to say that social costs of technological innovations are to be ignored! A
recent example of the ability of the U.S. government to take action in this regard was spurred
by the growing concern over the computer information processing and storage capabilities and
personal privacy. The Privacy Act of 1974 created the Privacy Protection Study Commission.
which has held hearings on the majJr types of personal information and record systems that
cu rrent1y exist; Le.• researchl statistical, em ployment, personnel, medical, insurance, depository,
and credit. Some of the public policy ｩ ｳ ｳ ｾ ｬ ･ ｳ uncovered by this review include: (1) Do we need
a ｲｩｧｨｴｾｦｾｷｮ･ｲｳｨｩｰ status for personal information? (2) Does factual information need to be
distinguished from subjective and conjectural information? (3) Should inform ation collected to
make a determination (and with no perceived future need) be distinguished from information
needing to be kept? (See Ware 1976.)
Competition and Selection Environments
Com petition plays a central role in all of the conceptual formulations of the innovation
process discussed above. The term "competition" does not refer Simply to price rivalry in a
commercial marketplace. A fundamental form of competition in technological innovation con-
cerns the ideas that are considered worth pursuing within a firm. Such competition involves
both the technical and economic aspects of new design concepts, and is usually sustained well
into the development process. For example, when a new system is under development at IBM,
program man agers for current lines are encouraged to look for ways to expand the capabilities
of their products. Although limited development resources are devoted to such activities, IBM
is careful not to cut off such competition. Current programs contending with new development
efforts proVide a type of insurance for the firm (Harman et al. 1977, p.36).
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In the computer industry, there have been opportunities at many stages for choices among
competing component technologies. The successful development of the transistor did not
automatically lead to the replacement of vacuum tubes. Rather, it depended on the economics
of production. The character of quality change of ｰ ｲ ｯ ､ ｵ ｣ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｩ ･ ｮ ｴ ･ ､ technological innovation
depends on the types of final users that are to be considered For the development of the
transistor, its capability and price relative to the vacuum tube were considered by computer
developers and man ufaeturers; in contrast, performance capabilities (including reliability and
ease of maintenance), as well as price are the principal dimensions for assessment by computer
users-virtually regardless of the components used in the design. Still, the development of
quantitative measures of ｵ ｳ ･ ｲ ｾ ｲ ｩ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｧ product quality dimensions that remain reliable over
time is indeed a difficult undertaking.
For other forms of competition, public policy plays a more prominent role. Let us con-
sider the industry perspective. As T.t.lton (1971) implicitly points out, Klein's "hidden foot-
rivalry has played a very important role in the semiconductor industry:
The market structure of the semiconductor industry (in the United
States, Britain. France, Germany, and Japan) ...is such that established
firms are promptly disdplined or replaced when they fail to act qUickly.
(Tuton 1971, p.48, see also Klein 1977, pp.128-13S.)
In contrast. European countries have pursued consolidation policies within their computer
industry and have fared much less successfUlly. Perhaps it is fortunate that Europe did not fol-
low ｓ ･ ｲ ｶ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｨ ｲ ･ ｩ ｢ ･ ｲ Ｇ ｳ urging: llle logical policy for Europe would be to pool all the resources
we can muster-probably from a British nucleus with immediate support from French. German
and Dutch industry-into a unified effort, while blocking off some outlets for our own products.
011y with a market of this size can we hope to compete with the Americans between now and
1980- (Servan-&hreiber 1967, Ch. XIV).
Antitrust Policies l7
For several reasons government antitrust policies have been effective in promoting rivalry
among U.S firms. Through a consent decree ending the Justive Department's suit against IBM
in 1956, IEM' was reqUired to sell its machines as well as to rent them. This led to greater com-
petition in the sale of computer services and encouraged the development of this branch of the
information processing industry (Harman 1971. p.13). Similarly. an antitrust suit against AU
initiated by the Justice Department in 1949 was finally settled by a consent decree in 1956 that
led to a substantial shift in the dissemination of AlT controlled patents-9ll existing patents
were to be licensed royalty free by Western Electric to any ｬ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ･ ｳ ｴ ･ ｾ domestic firm (although
Western Electric could ask for a cross licensing provision) and all future patents were to be
licensed for -reasonable royalties" 01 patents for semiconductors. royalties were generally set
at no more than 2 percent of sales ('TIlton 1971, pp. 7S, 74,76). These new licensing polides-
implemented by the firms under government pressure-set a standard that encouraged the
diffusion of technology and "hidden foot- rivalry, which supported a continued rapid rate of
technological innovation.
T6":------
ｦ ｯ ｾ elaboralion of lhis poinl. see' Harman e: at 1977. Linstone and Sahal 1976.
• 'The still pending U.S Justice Departmenl anlitrusl case againsl IBM is a matler that will nOI be deall "'ilh
in lhis paper.
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Procurement Actions and New Entry
For both the semiconductor and computer industries, the earl\ development of the
government market was an important stimulus for product innovation. nlton has discussed
the link between qualitative improvements in semiconductors over time and the various end-
users of the product; he attributes much of the stimulus for rapid innovative advances in pro-
duct quality, as well as rapid diffusion of innovations throughout the U.S. industry, to demand-
ing government reqUirements. Utterbaclc. and Murray (1977) concluded that government pro-
curement provided a more important stimulus to the civilian electronics industry than did direct
support of R&D (although government procurement has since lost much of its significance for
this sector).
Government procurement has also played a useful role in encouraging new finns to enter
these industries, although there is little evidence that such a policy has been deliberate or has
recognized the important role that entry or the threat of entry plays in stimulating technological
innovation. (See, for example, Baumbusch and Harman 1977, pp.47-50, 53-56; and Baum-
busch et al. 1978, ｰｰＮｾＲＮＩ
In avery pragmatic and insightful discussion of ways of diagnosing the existence of mono-
poly, Fisher concludes that the role of entry is particularly important. He states:
....whether considered as a phenomenon of new finns coming into the
business or a phenomenon of older firms able to expand .. , the analysis
of entry conditions is the analysis of a central phenomenon which places
or does not place constraints on the behavior of the alleged monopolist.
It is therefore with some regret that I have to say that the analysis of bar-
riers to entry is, in my view, the single most misunderstood topic in the
analysis of competition and monopoly (Fisher 1978, p.28.)
The availability of venture capital also helps to encourage the threat of new entry. In this
regard. President Carter's Industrial Innovation Initiative-dealing with both fostering and
development of small innovative firms and opening federal procurement to innovations-are
small steps in the right direction. The income tax credit proposed in this paper would also be
useful in this context, since new firms would have especially high R&D/sales ratios while initial
sales are low. Further policy consideration of the role of new entries in stimulating technologi-
cal innovation is warranted.
International Economic Policies
Finally, competition in the context of world markets merits some discussion. One issue
concerns the protection of domestic markets from foreign competition through tariff or non-
tariff barriers. Ole does not have to follow the trade press very closely to know that the sem-
iconductor industry has been unhappy with the recent situation. An executive in a semiconduc-
tor firm has described his concerns in the following terms:
u.s. companies can compete against any foreign manufacturer if we have
Free Trade on an equal basis. This means that both Tariff and non-Tariff
barriers in Japan and Europe need to be removed or equalized This is
particularly true of Japan where import duties for U.S. companies are
considerably higher than U.S. duties for Japanese products and non-tariff
barriers keep U.S. semiconductor products from being used in certain
markets such as Telecommunications; it is also going to be very
TBTilton 1971, Ch.i; Harman 197', Ch.2; ue also the stltements by Heilmeier and Corrigan in Indusnial
Technology 1978.
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important that two tier pricing as employed by the Japanese (lower U.S.
prices than in their own markets) not be tolerated and a mechanism set
up to quickly impose penalties on foreign semiconductor manufacturers
. (before the damage is done) who operate with a two tier price scheme.
Although such concerns are serious, the solution is not to establish retaliatory barriers; com-
petition at many levels (even from foreign sources) fosters further technological innovation,
and there is clearly room for further advances in semiconductor technology (see Sutherland et
al. 1976). Although the Tokyo round of the General Agreement on 'lrade and Tariffs
(GATn has made some progress in the areas of tariff and nontariff barriers, the
macroeconomic effects for the United States are likely to be very small.
The transfer of technology and limitations on direct ownership of foreign operations have
been important in both the computer and semiconductor industries. Japan in pamcularhas
orchestrated a set of government policies' that have proven very beneficial to their domestic
industries. These issues have been treated elsewhere (Harman 1971, TIlton 1971), but may be
useful topics for further consideration, since they fall outside of the GA'IT framework. Simi-
larly, it may be useful to consider more carefully the relationship between the parties to GAIT
and centrally planned economies.
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IV. REPRISE: 1HE POLICY PR0PC6AL
Policy recommendations should follow from the identification and clarification of a prob-
lem. D.Jt, as suggested at the outset, the understanding and shaping of the process of techno-
logical innovation is progreSSing more like the gropings of a lobster's claws than the coordinated
fists of a boxer.
In the ieft claw" we have insights from theoretical analyses (as sketched in Section IT
rather selectively from a vast amount of relevant research); these can be summarized as fol-
lows:
1. Innovation may be seen as a process of uncertainty reduction in response to a final
demand, based on private or public needs.
2. Neoclassical economic theory provides insights into changes "at the margin" from
influences such as changes in prices of goods or inputs; such theory is well
developed but not entirely adequate for dealing with uncertainties and shedding light
on the processes through which predicted outcomes occur.
3. The evolutionary theory of Nelson and Winter (1977) provides, at least, a useful
vocabUlary for understanding the process.
a Natural trajectories of technological innovation depend for "next steps" on the
present status of the firm and are based on underlying scientific progress that is
not altered rapidly by reallocation of resources.
b. Selection enVironments, involving both market forces and
bureaucratic/political decisionmaking, determine the success of innovations
and contribute to shaping the innovation process.
4. The dynamic theory of Klein (1977) attempts to build on the biological metaphor of
considerable experimentation and diversity by firms, as a response to uncertainty at
the rnicro-economic level, leading to stability and rapid progress at the macro-
economic level; lagging individual firms suffer the '"hidden foot" feedback of loss of
market share, with the threat of such feedback spurring others on to further innova-
tion.
5. International consequences of technological innovation, as well as of the relative
availability of productive inputs and raw materials, are becoming increasingly impor-
tant for domestic progress (Hufbauer 1970).
The "right claw" of the lobster is grasping for facts about the world (as reviewed in Section
ITn that one should be cognizant of when considering policy options; these may be briefly
described as follows:
1. Uncertainty, Ideas, and Imperfect Appropriability (personal gratification). There are
individuals involved throughout the process of creating and adapting new products
and services, many of whom en,py the challenges of uncertainty resolution. All
potentially suffer from a lack of pb security and an inability to capture the complete
returns of their contribu tion to the creative (and profitable) efforts of their teams
and firms.
2. Returns to R&D and Related Investment (corporate gratification). Due to the risks
and uncertainties of the innovation process, returns to R&D and related investment
have been high in many cases, but the meager empirical evidence which is aVailable
(Mansfield et aI. 1977) suggests that private returns are still less than social
benefits, and may in some cases be less than the private returns of less risky activi-
ties.
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3. Competition and Selection Environments (societal gratification). Where markets can
be relied upon to transmit society's needs, efficient production and stimulation of
future innovation occurs (subject, of course, to the feasibility of capturing adequate
returns). Selection environments involving direct or indirect involvement of
bureaucratic/political processes for the full articulation of societal needs are widely
perceived to be (at times) inimical to innovation, and can potentially undermine
competitive positions internationally.
By such "clawing" at the complex and rapidly changing world into which government
actions extend, has it been demonstrated that a "mark.et failure" is occurring. of sufficient
dimension to outweigh the inherent costs of government action to implement remedies (Wolf
1979)? The answer is no. Nor have the far more extensive efforts of the President's Dom estic
Policy Review in the United States and considerable related contemporary research shown that
such a failure is occurring. Umits of current knowledge and uncertainties about the world are
too great to allow an unambiguous signal for action.
Under such circumstances it may be best to rely on a broader perspective when reviewing
evidence of the need for policy action. Technology and innovation have been principal
ingredients in American economic development for more than a century, and this pattern was
exhibited by the United Kingdom earlier. In recent times, technology has contributed to the
important standing of American industry in world marlc.ets; technology4Jased American firms
have provided a large portion of the foreign earnings used to obtain important raw and pro-
cessed materials from abroad. But there is a concern about declining international competitive-
ness; the undiagnosed decline in the United Kingdom's competitiveness during the period from
1890 to World War IT illustrates the risks of inaction. Although employment impacts of tech-
nological change have not been as severe in the United States as they seem to have been in
Europe (Rothwell and Zegveld 1979), rigidities in labor mark.ets have been identified as "the
heart of developed countries long-term problems· (Interfutures 1977, p.170). Moreover,the
President's extended Domestic Policy ReView on Industrial Innovation has encouraged expecta-
tions that important policy actions would follow.
Suppose we assume for the moment that the preceding brief review of theory and evi-
dence prOVided a sufficient case for action. Still, many possibilities exist (see Figure 2). Even
if the goals of many of these potential policy actions would enpy broad political agreement, the
mechanisms of policy implementation often can be cumbersome and counterproductive.
Thus, instead of evaluating a wide range of alternative policies (some of which have been
impliCitly endorsed or dismissed in this ｐ ｃ Ｓ ｦ ｾ ｲ Ｉ Ｎ one tax policy is proposed here and evaluated in
the context of the theoretical and empirical insights reviewed above:
PR0PC6AL: Gra1"\t a personal income ta." credit of, say, 101. to each
ｩ ｮ ､ ｩ Ｇ Ｑ ｾ ｕ ｡ ｬ earning income from every highly R&D-intensive, forl'rofit
firm.
Let us first consider the immediate effect of this tax policy;he after-tax wages and
salaries of individuals employed in companies that invest heavily in R&D would rise, regardless
of the economic sector in which they are employed. Ole of the most important arguments for
stimulating innovation through tax policy is that government agencies need not be directly
involved in the decisionmaking on how the proceeds of the indirect subsidy are to be used.
ｾ ･ Section III for a sketch of some of the pOllible a1temative fonnulations of such an income tax cred:il:.
and for a suggested de1lnition of ｾ ｒ Ｆ Ｚ ｄ intensive.· Of course. ｴ ｾ mechanism for Implementing such a potiey
could be as easy as allowing qualified firms to print an Bltl'rick (or other suitable Identif)'ing mark) in the ap-
propriate place on their employees' ｗ ｾ forms. Clearly. this proposal could be enacted .. part of s luger tax
proposal so that the overall fiscal effea could be neulralized or tailored to the explicit purposes of a
comprehensive fiscal policy.
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Figure 2. Policy-analytic framework for viewing government impacts
on technological innovation.
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Since a firm does not have to make new capital investments to qualify, new and small firms
may benefit even dUring times of tight monetary policies. The salary increases would provide a
signal to the labor ｭ ﾥ ｾ ･ ｴ of the types of firms that are likely to provide attractive pb oppor-
tunities in the future. It will be recognized that if pb security is lower in such companies,
some compensation would be provided by the government in the form of higher current
income. This amounts to a recognition of the ·personal gratification- issues noted above.
After a time, there would be labor market adjJstments to this new tax credit. For some
occupations and activities (especially the unskilled and some semi-skilled ones). it is suspected
that the wages paid by the R8cD-intensive fmns would be less than standard market rates in
various geographical areas-the firms could capture some or all of the tax credit as indirect wage
subsidies! Is this undesirable? Certainly not. if we expect such firms to be as competitive as
possible in regional, national, and world markets. They must be encouraged to be as cost-
conscious as possible. The proceeds of these subsidies could be used by the fum to hire ｾ ｯ ｲ
labor or to invest further in R8cD, in capital equipment, or elsewhere as the fum sees fit -
subject to the multitude of regulatory and other government -guidance- to the firm, and to the
future discipline of the marketplace.
In addition, existing firms whose employees do not quite qUalify for the income tax credit
will come under pressure to invest more heavily in R8cD. There are many uncertainties (and
even hOpes) about the outcomes of such efforts, but one thing is certain-some firms will try to
redefine their expenditures to give the appearance of more R8cD. CDntrol of cheating is a
difficult problem for many economic and social policies. No announced polity of selective
enforcement would be desirable, but if large firms are carefully scrutinized, the laxer enforce-
ment of small firms could act as a form of compensation for the relatively larger burden they
shoulder in complying with regulatory policies. In any case, if such finns expand they would
become more vulnerable to closer scrutiny. and presumably to sizable penalties for cheating.
For these reasons, the long-term and indirect effects of this proposal would be to subsi-
dize ｒ Ｘ ｣ ｄ ｾ ｮ ｴ ･ ｮ ｳ ｩ ｶ ･ (and espeCially smaller and more labor intensive) firms, with the proceeds
of the indirect subsidy remaining relatively unrestricted This responds to the need for -cor-
porate gratification- as discussed above.
What about the benefits to the larger society-what has been called -societal gratification-?
If there is one message in this paper, it is that investments in R8cD and the larger process of
technological innovation is an inherently uncertain process. There are no guarantees. BJt if
history is any guide, such a policy should help stimulate the creation of new products, the
reduction of prices of many existing products, and perhaps even a more widespread public
appreciation of the increased security and societal stability gained through encouraging some of
its individual members to take innovative risks.
ｾ Ｍ ｵ point also rellIes to nlIional security considerations, since the !!mployees of many firms receiving
R&D funding from the D!!panment of Ddense would quality for this tax credit. In I. r!!cent study, Defense
Industrial Planning for I. Surge in Military Dem and; we found t hii "firms T!!pelI!!dly emphasized that the
moS! sevl!'re problems in meetWlg surge dl!'mands would relate to the hiring of appropriately sldll!!d labor and
the timely acqUisition of additional equipmeont, with the former T!!ceivlnr the mOlt emphasis from both
current and no ncurrent defense producers. R (Bwmbwch et 1.1 1978, p.62. original italics).
21See the AJlPl!ndix for an analysis of som!! of the issues raised heT!!.
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APPENDIX
A SIMPLE NEOCLASSICAL ｍｏｄｾ OF INDUCED
'IECHNa.CX;ICAL INNOVAnON
Suppose the cost of process-oriented technological innovation ｾ Ｎ is a function of (Tt' To)
where Tt represents the level of technology at time t. And. to simplify the analysis, assume
that there is no cumulative advance-€very period starts off from To (otherwise T would be
viewed as a form of capital. needlessly complicating the point at issue here). Thus we assume
that: (a) "systematic· R&D expenditure. Et• can be directed toward technology relevant to the
firm's production, and (b) firms have to pay for their own technology; i.e., no transfers occur
from outside the firm.
Assume a production function homogeneous of degree 1 in the usual inputs, labor and
capital,
( 1 )
Trfhu milteriill dl"ilWS heilvily on il textbook fOm'luliltion ｯ ｾ this SUbjeCt: by Becker (197 i, Lecture 27.)
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and
where
af( )
ai
Furthennore. assume that T has a stable impact on marginal products of the factors of produc-
tion; we can define
Then
The process innovation cost function thus could be represented as
where
( 2)
and gi is the marginal ｣ ｯ ｳ ｾ of innovations yielding ith factor productivity enhancement. We
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could also rewrite the production function by representing T t by its influences on the marginal
products.
To minimize total cost-"roduction and "R8cD"-the firm will operate so that
(3 )
where w and v are the wage rate and the cost of capital services respectively. From equations
(1) and (2)
and similarly for MPKt" Also
and similarly for aKt. Substituting into equation (3), we have for Land aL
w
=
The resulting optimal aLt is
( 4 )
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q,timal choice of enhancement of the marginal product of labor input (relative to the
base period) will be equal to the ratio of total expenditure for Labor (the wage bill and not sim-
ply the price of labor, as is sometimes azgued) to the marginal cost of increasing its produc-
tivity. A similar result can be derived for aKt.
Interpretations:
1. Technological innovation will be "factor neutral" if marginal improvement costs are
proportional to expenditures on factors, Le., aLt - aKt if
Qherwise, technological innovation will be "biased toward" the factor whose "impro-
vability costs" (gi) are low relative to the total expenditure devoted to that factor.
From a public policy point of view, actions (e.g., tax policies) that tend to lower a
factor price paid by the firm would encourage the firm to invest more heavily in
improVing that factor's productivity, proVided that the elasticity of substitution
between factors is greater than unity. This interpretation is important to the per-
sanal income tax credit proposed in this paper.
2. Higher q would merit higher E-larger firms will invest (or invest more) in R&D
because there is a larger production volume (and hence a larger amount of factor
inputs) which can benefit from the enhanced marginal productivity of factors. These
increased R&D expenditures need not arise because of differential access to financial
markets or other forms of monopoly power.
The model presented here, of course, does not account for a variety of opportunities to
make advancements in different phases of the R&:D process. nor does it consider the market
imperfections which exist in many technology-intensive industries. However, it does illustrate
-25 -
the kind of insights that can be derived from the necessarily stringent -as it assumptions of the
neoclassical theoretical framework. Here, a word of caution is in order:
OJr predictions of the operations of markets and of the economy are sen-
sitive to our assumptions about mechanisms at the level of decision
processes. Moreover, the assumptions of the behavioral theories are
almost certainly closer to reality than those of the classical theory. These
two facts, in combination, constitute a direct refutation of the argument
that the unrealism of the assumptions of the classical theory is harmless.
We cannot use the in vacua version of the law of falling bodies to predict
the sinking of a heavy body in molasses. The predictions of the classical
and neoclassical theories and the policy recommendations derived from
them must be treated with the greatest caution. (Simon, 1979, p.509).
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